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INTRODUCTION
The controversies spawned by the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v.
Ohio1 are just about as expansive as the decision’s implications for the devel-
opment of Fourth Amendment doctrine.2 And it was recently observed that it is
perhaps the most criticized Fourth Amendment decision since the modern
Supreme Court belatedly incorporated the amendment, and eventually the
exclusionary rule.3 Fortunately, there is neither time nor space to address and
fully resolve all of these controversies, or even to determine whether the case
was just wrongly decided; the somewhat narrower thesis of this Article is that
the long-term impact of Terry on the development of Fourth Amendment
law—and on the whole idea of judicial supervision of law enforcement’s
Fourth Amendment activities—has been truly disastrous, as the Burger, Rehn-
quist, and Roberts Courts have all taken the case and run with it.
I. RELEVANT CONTROVERSIES WE NEED NOT RESOLVE
An initial controversy worth noting, even if not seeking to resolve here,
concerns the validity of a conventional defense of the Court’s holding in Terry.
Many criminal procedure teachers note that it may have been just as plausible,
in terms of history and precedent, to hold that the Fourth Amendment simply
does not apply to the relatively informal, and usually quite brief, detention we
label a “stop.”4 Instead, the Court answered the question whether police needed
only “reasonable suspicion” to justify a stop, or needed the “probable cause”
required for a formal arrest. So, one perspective on Terry is that it made a
positive contribution in just rejecting the idea that a “stop-and-frisk” is not a
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1 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2 For a brief treatment of the most salient of these controversies, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 4–27.
3 Lawrence Rosenthal, Pragmatism, Originalism, Race, and the Case Against Terry v.
Ohio, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 299, 299 (2010) [hereinafter Rosenthal, The Case Against
Terry].
4
“Ohio argued that because the stop was not a full-scale arrest, it did not require any justifi-
cation under the Fourth Amendment.” DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE:  RACE AND CLASS
IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 43 (1999) [hereinafter COLE, EQUAL JUSTICE].
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“seizure” or a “search” because such an intrusion did not amount to a “techni-
cal arrest” or a “full-blown search.”5
Justice Schaefer of the Illinois Supreme Court stated that Terry rejected
the idea that the “provisions of the Fourth Amendment are subject to verbal
manipulation.”6 And the Court stated its “intent to harness the practice [of stop
and frisk] within the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment.”7
From this perspective, Terry has been defended as being based on the “propor-
tionality principle,” as it equally rejected the idea that courts should wholly
defer to informal police decision-making just as it held that every seizure is not
subject to the requirement of probable cause.8 But even if the original decision
in Terry could be justified as an appropriate application of the “proportionality
principle,”9 a chief proponent of that defense has concluded that the principle
“seems to have been ignored even in cases purportedly applying Terry.”10
Similarly, there is room for debate as to whether, even if a standard requir-
ing less than probable cause was appropriate for evaluating a stop and frisk, the
Court adequately analyzed and applied that standard to the facts in the case.
Lewis Katz, for example, argued that Terry “dismally failed to strike an ade-
quate balance between effective law enforcement and individual freedom,” less
by its formulation of a standard as in its applying it so as to strike the balance
5 Wayne R. LaFave, “Street Encounters” and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and
Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 51 (1968) [hereinafter LaFave, “Street Encounters”]; Terry,
392 U.S. at 16–17 (reasoning that it tortures the language to characterize a frisk as a mere
“petty indignity” and hence not any sort of “search” at all); see also LaFave, “Street
Encounters,” supra, at 73 (arguing that “Terry’s value lies in the Court’s firm assertion that
police action under this new power will be scrutinized as closely as other enforcement activi-
ties touched by the Constitution”); Scott E. Sundby, An Ode to Probable Cause: A Brief
Response to Professors Amar and Slobogin, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1133, 1133 (1998) [here-
inafter Sundby, Probable Cause] (a Terry critic observing that both Terry and Camara v.
Municipal Court—another decision requiring less than probable cause, as to administrative
searches—“were efforts to make the Fourth Amendment as expansive as the Court thought
possible under the circumstances”).
6 LaFave, “Street Encounters,” supra note 5, at 52.
7 Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423, 428
(2004) [hereinafter Katz, A Revisionist View].
8 Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the Proportional-
ity Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053 (1998) [hereinafter Slobogin, The Proportionality
Principle]. There are, of course, important commentators who concur that the “proportional-
ity principle” was grounded in too great a willingness to defer to police exercise of discre-
tionary judgment, or at least failed to articulate a sufficiently narrow exception to a general
requirement of probable cause. E.g., Sundby, Probable Cause, supra note 5, at 1135 (argu-
ing that Terry’s difficulty grows from “the long-term consequences” of “holding in terms of
a broadly framed reasonableness balancing test;” whereas Terry itself described the reasona-
ble suspicion standard as stating “a narrow departure from the norm of probable cause,” the
lower standard subsequently “has taken on a life of its own”).
9 A number of commentators, including Professor Sundby, argue that Terry has been under-
stood as “uncoupling” the Warrant Clause and the Reasonableness Clause, thus opening the
door to a general resort to the Reasonableness Clause, and a balancing test, rather than
seeing stop and frisk as embodying a narrow exception to the general rule in favor of the
Warrant Clause and the Probable Cause requirement. Accord Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s
Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1271,
1310 n.112 (1998) [hereinafter Maclin, Fourth Amendment Legacy].
10 Slobogin, The Proportionality Principle, supra note 8, at 1055.
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“completely in favor of the police.”11 Equally important, on this view, “the
balance has been further tipped in favor of police by later Supreme Courts.”12
In Terry itself, its critics contend, the evidence relied upon to justify the deten-
tion supplied a weak justification for the legal conclusions reached by the
Court.13 One contention, for example, was that Officer McFadden acted on a
“hunch,” rather than articulable, reasonable grounds for suspicion, based on
evidence “which might have warranted his continuing interest in [the suspected
parties] but certainly not a lawful seizure based upon such paltry and contradic-
tory information.”14
At the same time, of course, at least some commentators have written as
though the Court’s “suspicion” standard was fairly applied and at least had the
potential for being developed to strike the right Fourth Amendment balances.15
Despite this, however, even some defenders of the original decision in Terry
suggest the Court initially struck the right balance, but subsequently erred in
applying the balancing test in a manner that advanced an ad hoc agenda.16
A related point is that the Court in Terry came close to punting on the
“critical threshold question” concerning “when the stop occurred,” an issue that
needed expanded treatment.17 Instead, the Court moved quickly to considering
the justification for the less intrusive search called a “frisk.” In not really con-
fronting the problem of defining when temporary detentions are justified, the
Court more or less stated a “suspicion” standard, but “without pausing to con-
sider whether a police suspicion test could (or would) be cabined in future
cases.”18 Justice Harlan, concurring, contended that, in LaFave’s words, “the
issue of the officer’s right to stop should be resolved before any other questions
are reached.”19 Considering that Terry was a substantial effort, consisting of a
majority opinion, two concurring opinions, and a dissent, the Court’s initial
effort on the stop and frisk issue “might well lead one to wish that the Court
had written less and said more.”20
11 Katz, A Revisionist View, supra note 7, at 424.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 431–34; accord Maclin, Fourth Amendment Legacy, supra note 9, at 1301 (critiqu-
ing whether Officer McFadden’s testimony was adequate to establish reasonable suspicion
and to justify the frisk); Paul Butler, The White Fourth Amendment, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV.
245, 248 (2010) (underscoring that the officer did not even stop Terry, despite describing
him as seemingly “casing” a jewelry store, until he “stopped to talk to a white man;” observ-
ing, in addition, that “Cleveland police lore held that when a black man and a white man got
together, they were likely to be planning a crime”).
14 Katz, A Revisionist View, supra note 7, at 456.
15 See, e.g., LaFave, “Street Encounters,” supra note 5, at 42, 47–48, 55.
16 E.g., Slobogin, The Proportionality Principle, supra note 8, at 1095.
17 Katz, A Revisionist View, supra note 7, at 444–45. Professor LaFave observed, for exam-
ple, that the opinion “does not give separate consideration to the grounds for the seizure,”
compared to the frisk (or “search”). LaFave, “Street Encounters,” supra note 5, at 64;
accord Katz, A Revisionist View, supra note 7, at 445 (observing that the Court never
resolved whether a detention occurred prior to the contact involving the frisk). For thought-
ful analysis of how the Court might have gone about more adequately developing the “rea-
sonable suspicion” standard, see LaFave, “Street Encounters,” supra note 5, at 51–84.
18 Maclin, Fourth Amendment Legacy, supra note 9, at 1309.
19 LaFave, “Street Encounters,” supra note 5, at 63. See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
32–33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
20 LaFave, “Street Encounters,” supra note 5, at 46.
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And in the long run, the Terry Court’s failure to adequately address the
“stop” justification encouraged a later Court “to hold that Fourth Amendment
seizures occur far later in a police-citizen encounter, thus delaying citizens’ . . .
power which has resulted in an erosion of civil liberties and an arguably unre-
strained sanctioning of police powers.”21 In light of the Court’s treatment,
some contend that Terry reflected a resignation to the exercise of police discre-
tion, whatever standard was devised.22 Terry’s critics thus conclude that the
Court “opened the door for the subsequent restrictions on individual rights by
its standardless decision in Terry.”23 But even defenders of the original deci-
sion often contend that “the Court has expanded the breadth of a Terry stop
well beyond its original, limited beginnings.”24 So even if the ultimate merits
of the holding in Terry remains unresolved, there are powerful reasons to con-
clude that its expansion over time has had a negative effect on developing
Fourth Amendment doctrine. Thus Terry’s narrow right to “stop,” or briefly
detain someone based on reasonable suspicion, eventually became a “broad
arrest-like power[ ],” a power that enables police to move passengers and to
“force suspects to lie prone on the ground.”25 This expansion has led to grant-
ing police power to require individuals to speak in identifying themselves and
the like. It has justified, for example, police ordering both drivers and passen-
gers out of automobiles during a stop.26 So, even defenders of the original
decision are known to contend that “it is not the mere use of the reasonableness
balancing test that must be reevaluated but the manner in which courts employ
the reasonableness test.”27
II. TERRY’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PRACTICE OF RACIAL PROFILING
Even some of the additional controversies arising from Terry are ones that
we need not fully analyze and totally resolve. One is whether the Court in that
case adequately confronted how a police suspicion standard might affect Fourth
Amendment rights of blacks and other disfavored minorities. Another is
whether the Court has adequately developed the “reasonable suspicion” stan-
dard to avoid excessive police discretion that yields undue racial profiling.
Beyond these difficult questions concerning the decision itself and its applica-
tion, however, it is quite clear that the thrust of the Terry decision, as construed
and explicated over time and in how it has connected with other criminal proce-
21 Katz, A Revisionist View, supra note 7, at 449.
22 Id. at 443.
23 Id. at 429 (emphasis added).
24 E. Martin Estrada, Criminalizing Silence: Hiibel and the Continuing Expansion of the
Terry Doctrine, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 279, 309 (2005) [hereinafter Estrada, Criminalizing
Silence] (emphasis added). For an analogous and extended argument that the Court has all
but abandoned “the proportionality principle” that justifies its holding in Terry in its applica-
tions of the case’s doctrine, see Slobogin, The Proportionality Principle, supra note 8.
25 Estrada, Criminalizing Silence, supra note 24, at 279.
26 Id. at 285.
27 Id. at 314. The balancing, on this view, must in the process give due weight to individual
privacy interests. Id. at 315. Justice Jackson, we are reminded, observed that “‘[[t]he rights
ensured by the Fourth Amendment] . . . are not mere second–class rights but belong in the
catalog of indispensable freedoms.’” Id. (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
180–81 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
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dure doctrine, has lent powerful support to race-based enforcement of the
nation’s laws.
A. The Terry Decision and Racialized Policing
There is no question that the Court in Terry recognized that the problem of
race relations was relevant to justifying the application of the Fourth Amend-
ment to stops and frisks.28 Indeed, the Court attempted to formulate a standard
by which courts might appropriately oversee police conduct that impacted on
minorities; and this was no doubt a reason it rejected the argument that the
Fourth Amendment just did not apply to the action of stop and frisk at all.29
If there is a complaint about the Terry Court’s treatment of the risk and
danger of racial profiling—which included its acknowledgement of the “fre-
quent[ ] complain[ts]” by minority groups of their “wholesale harassment by
certain elements of the police community”—it is that the Court centered its
analysis on whether that risk justified what it characterized as “a rigid and
unthinking application of the exclusionary rule.”30 Excluding the evidence,
Chief Justice Warren reasoned, would be a “futile protest against practices
which it can never be used effectively to control,” a protest that “may exact a
high toll in human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent crime.”31 This
meant, for the Court, that although the judiciary should “guard against police
conduct which is over-bearing or harassing,” society may be required to rely on
“other remedies than the exclusionary rule to curtail abuses for which that sanc-
tion [the exclusionary rule] may prove inappropriate.”32 The decision to focus
on the likely effectiveness of the exclusionary rule arguably was in part based
on, and reinforced, the Court’s clear reluctance to examine closely the prof-
28 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14–15 & n.11 (1968).
29 As suggested by earlier analysis, the Court conceived itself as supporting judicial regula-
tion of law enforcement and, as some commentators stated it, rejecting the view that the
“requirement of probable cause is an inflexible standard which demands precisely the same
amount of evidence no matter what kind of police action is involved.” LaFave, “Street
Encounters,” supra note 5, at 54.
30 Terry, 392 U.S. at 14–15.
31 Id. at 15. The point is well taken when stops are instrumental to preventing crime, but
more debatable as to actions the Court itself characterizes as “harassing.” Compare LaFave,
“Street Encounters,” supra note 5, at 62 (contending that “it would be harsh medicine” to
exclude evidence derived from reasonable stops “in order to administer an indirect and inef-
fective slap” at illegitimate and improper stops), with Maclin, Fourth Amendment Legacy,
supra note 9, at 1313 (contending that the “effectiveness of the exclusionary rule’s deterrent
function should not control the substantive content of the Fourth Amendment;” otherwise,
the exclusionary rule tail is wagging the Fourth Amendment dog).
32 Terry, 392 U.S. at 15. A related controversy is whether the conclusion that law enforce-
ment officials will almost invariably act if they fear the potential for being victimized by
violence cuts against application of the Fourth Amendment and exclusionary rule or in their
favor. Compare Terry, 392 U.S. at 15 (expressing view that use of the exclusionary rule in
stop and frisk cases could easily amount to a “futile protest against practices which it can
never be used effectively to control” and “may exact a high toll in human injury and frustra-
tion of efforts to prevent crime”), with Maclin, Fourth Amendment Legacy, supra note 9, at
1319 (though we would expect that “police officers would always take steps to protect them-
selves in situations they viewed as threatening to their safety,” it does not follow that we
should not prohibit “the admission of evidence in a criminal trial where officers discover
weapons or contraband as a result of an illegal search”); see also id. at 1317–20.
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fered justification for the Fourth Amendment “seizure” the Court called a
“stop.”33 Moreover, the Court’s reliance on the difficulty of applying the
Exclusionary Rule in this context “purports to examine the cost of applying the
constitutional protection without ever considering the costs of not applying the
constitutional protection.”34
B. Racial Profiling and the Development of the Reasonable Suspicion
Standard
Whatever one makes of the original Terry decision’s achievements and
failures, and the possibilities it generated—perhaps especially with respect to
race-based decision-making as a part of our criminal justice system—it is rea-
sonably clear that the Terry stop-and-frisk doctrine has lent itself too readily to
supporting law enforcement efforts rooted in stereotypical generalizations and
racial profiling. So the developments in constitutional criminal procedure grow-
ing directly out of Terry have done nothing but strengthen the tendency of the
criminal justice system to work so as to harm the just rights and interests of
racial minorities.35 This remains true notwithstanding that Terry itself, and its
most direct implications for law enforcement actions, have had strenuous
defenders.36
The further we go along, the clearer it becomes that there is widespread
“racialized policing,” what we have labeled as “racial profiling,” and that its
pervasive presence is so important in part because it is measurable.37 Professor
33 This reluctance fit nicely together with the Court’s failure to fully formulate and apply the
standard for determining when temporary detentions are justified. See supra notes 19–21 and
accompanying text.
34 Katz, A Revisionist View, supra note 7, at 451. Relying on the difficulties of applying the
exclusionary rule in the stop context also reinforces that granting wide discretion to police
makes racial profiling that much more likely. One strong reaction focused right here:
If the Court truly could not tell precisely when the seizure took place, that uncertainty demon-
strates a complete lack of understanding of the relationship on the street between police and
citizens, especially between police and black citizens. It is an understanding that the present
Court totally lacks, but we had expected better of the Warren Court.
Id. at 446.
35 For analysis and evidence demonstrating the harmful impact of Terry on the law of con-
stitutional criminal procedure, and negative implications for the treatment of racial minori-
ties, and especially African Americans, see MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:
MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 60–77 (2010) [hereinafter ALEXAN-
DER, THE NEW JIM CROW].
36 For a summary treatment and response to some prominent defenses of the original deci-
sion in Terry and its impact on constitutional criminal procedure law, see infra notes 88–110
and accompanying text.
37 E.g., I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the
Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 14 (2011). Capers observes that a Mary-
land State Police report showed that blacks comprise 72.9 percent of all drivers stopped and
searched along Interstate 95, even though they comprise 17.5 percent of drivers violating
traffic laws on the same route. Id. at 14–15. Police in Los Angeles were 127 percent “more
likely to search stopped blacks than to search stopped whites.” Id. at 15. Similarly, in New
York 30 percent of those stopped were black, often “more than ten times their percentage of
the overall population” in relevant precincts. I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place,
44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 66–67 (2009) [hereinafter Capers, Policing, Race, and
Place].
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Tonry points out that the research “concludes that police stop blacks dispropor-
tionately often on sidewalks and streets and generally find contraband at lower
rates for blacks than for whites.”38 The wide use of racial profiling is reinforced
by Terry’s holding as well as by the way the suspicion standard has been
expansively applied over time.39 The Supreme Court itself initially formed
some limits on what could constitute reasonable suspicion, emphasizing that
personal conduct in a “high-crime area,” or associating with known drug users,
did not of themselves constitute evidence yielding reasonable suspicion.40
Yet as the years passed, Professor Harris found that courts regularly find
adequate grounds for suspicion based on factors similar to those initially found
insufficient.41 Thus “[m]inority group members can be not only stopped, but
subjected to a frisk without any evidence that they are armed or dangerous, just
because . . . [of] the neighborhoods in which they work or live.”42 Illustrative
of the discretion granted to police by courts applying Terry doctrine is the
frequent reliance by law enforcement on “investigative profiles,” as in their use
of so-called drug courier profiles. The consequence is that, despite the lack of
thorough record-keeping, the “evidence overwhelmingly suggests that police
frequently stop and frisk African Americans and Hispanic Americans based on
very little evidence.”43 The net result “is the effect these stops have in widening
the racial divide in the United States.”44
Such profiles often rely on apparent correlations between specified behav-
iors and criminal activity.45 Even though the Supreme Court has ruled that
conformance with some elements of a profile may not constitute reasonable
suspicion, requiring “independent judgment” by courts,46 it has also reasoned
38 MICHAEL TONRY, PUNISHING RACE: A CONTINUING AMERICAN DILEMMA 50 (2011).  He
also observes that blacks are not only stopped more frequently than whites, but are also more
likely to be frisked, despite lower success rates in discovering weapons. Id. at 51. Tonry also
points to evidence supporting the conclusions that blacks do not use or sell drugs more than
whites, but are more likely to be arrested, convicted, and imprisoned. See id. at 57–73.
39 For a brief summary of some of the ways Terry has been applied to expand police powers
and discretion, see supra notes 21–27 and accompanying text.
40 COLE, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 43.
41 David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 672–75 (1994). See COLE, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra
note 4, at 43–44.
42 David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1, 44 (1994) (emphasis omitted). The discretion recognized in law enforcement has been
powerfully reinforced by Terry and its progeny, but also by the Court’s broad interpretation
of the scope of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. ALEXANDER, THE NEW
JIM CROW, supra note 35, at 61 (by 1990-1991 “it had become clear that a major shift in the
relationship between the citizens of this country and the police was underway”). In one
dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens observed that in 30 cases involving narcotics decided in
the nine previous years, the Court had upheld searches without warrants in all but three
cases. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 600 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). He con-
cluded that “this Court has become a loyal foot soldier in the Executive’s fight against
crime.” Id. at 601.
43 Harris, supra note 41, at 681.
44 Id.
45 Slobogin, supra note 8, at 1085.
46 David Cole, Foreword: Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the
New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1077 (1999) [hereinafter Cole, Dis-
cretion and Discrimination]. See, e.g., Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980). See also
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that appellate courts should grant “due weight” to a trial court’s conclusion that
an officer drew “inferences based on his own experience,” and was therefore
“credible” and “reasonable.”47 So, lower courts often defer to law enforcement.
Moreover, considering that law enforcement officers can frequently engage in
police/citizen “encounters” that do not amount to Fourth Amendment seizures
governed by the Terry standard, drug investigators in particular rely heavily on
drug courier profiles in conducting their investigations.48 Yet “drug courier
profiles are often so expansive that they operate much like the traffic code—
virtually anyone the police choose to stop will fit multiple factors of the
profile.”49
C. Beyond Terry Itself—Judicial Approval of Various Forms of Racial
Profiling
Applications of the Terry “reasonable suspicion” doctrine are a tricky bus-
iness to be sure, and even among those seeking to avoid “racialized law
enforcement” it is not clear that an important part of the answer is simply
rejecting, and advocating the overruling of, its holding.50 But there is little
room for doubt that the use and application of the Terry-based “reasonable
suspicion” doctrine can greatly expand or contract the exercise of police discre-
tion, with the expansion of such discretion lending itself to race-based deci-
sions, and otherwise arbitrary practices, by law enforcement.51 We have
generally expanded the discretion granted to law enforcement through the deci-
sion in Terry and its progeny. Moreover, the Court over time has come to
distinguish between Terry “stops” and police/citizen “encounters” that are not
governed or limited by the Fourth Amendment at all. Racial minorities have
been significantly disadvantaged by the discretion granted to law enforcement
in Fourth Amendment doctrines related to traffic stops, various forms of police
sweeps, the definition of a “search,” and the idea of “consent searches.” One
cannot help but see a close relationship between the analysis, goals, and appli-
CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  AN ANALY-
SIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 87 (4th ed. 2003).
47 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996).
48 See Cole, Discretion and Discrimination, supra note 46, at 1077–79. For a brief sum-
mary of how courts distinguish between, and thus decide on, “encounters” and “seizures,”
see WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 46, at 273.
49 Cole, Discretion and Discrimination, supra note 46, at 1077. They thus provide “an all-
purpose checklist to justify stopping anybody the law enforcement officer selects.” Id. at
1079. But notice that an officer testified that at least 75 percent of those followed and ques-
tioned at an airport were black. Id.; see also ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW, supra note
35, at 71 (profiles provide an excuse for stopping whomever police choose to) (citing COLE,
EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 49).
50 For example, a strong advocate of construing the Fourth Amendment to further equal
citizenship, Professor Bennett Capers, doubts whether we could or should “re-think” Terry,
or that modifying it would “do much to override the implicit biases officers, and indeed all
of us, have.” Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, supra note 37, at 73.
51 See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” From Start to Finish: Too Much
“Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1844–45 (2004)
[hereinafter LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop”].
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cations of Terry doctrine and these related doctrines that have greatly expanded
police discretion in their pursuit of the war on drugs.52
1. The Uses and Scope of Terry Stops
Exemplary was the en banc decision of the Seventh Circuit in United
States v. Childs.53 There, the circuit court reasoned that even lengthy and scru-
tinizing questioning about matters unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop, in
an effort to investigate “other offenses,” has no potential for exceeding the
scope of a legitimate (or “reasonable”) “detention” under Terry—so long as it
does not significantly add to the length of the stop.54 Even the standard and
ordinary requirement stated in Terry, and fully developed subsequently, that
such “stops” should “promptly” determine the validity of the suspicion giving
rise to the stop, was viewed as having no significant application in Childs. The
circuit court concluded that the “duration limitation” imposed by Terry simply
did not apply to those facts because the vehicle had been stopped because of a
broken windshield, and partly based on a seat-belt violation, which created
“probable cause” that a traffic violation had occurred. Even as it acknowledged
that additional investigative activities could become “unreasonable” under the
Fourth Amendment, the court still reasoned that police were not limited to
promptly completing the business directly related to the basis for the initial
stop.55
By contrast, Professor LaFave argued that if law enforcement’s justifica-
tion for detention is centered on the grounds for the traffic stop, it remains true
that “[w]hat the Constitution requires is that the entire process remain reasona-
ble.”56 Consequently, he contends, “Terry limitations apply without modifica-
tion even to those traffic stops made upon probable cause.”57 But what LaFave
found most disturbing about Childs was that the decision constituted “a posi-
tive encouragement to the police to engage in pretextual activity—making
stops whose sole legal justification is traffic regulation in order to seek out
drugs when grounds are lacking to detain for a narcotics investigation.”58 In
LaFave’s mind, Childs begins a descent “down the slippery slope.”59 As prob-
lematic as one might find the application of Terry to the facts of Childs, of still
greater concern is that Childs suggests a strategy for avoiding the “suspicion”
52 Thus Professor Alexander observes that the Supreme Court’s rules, in applying the
Fourth Amendment, “have ensured that anyone, virtually anywhere, for any reason, can
become a target of drug-law enforcement activity.” ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW, supra
note 35, at 62.
53 277 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
54 Id. at 951–54.  The case is usefully discussed at LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop,”
supra note 51, at 1865–74.
55 LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop,” supra  note 51, at 1869.
56 Id. at 1868.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 1870.
59 Id. at 1872.  LaFave observed that the Court has warned “that because ‘unconstitutional
practices get their first footing . . . by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal
modes of procedure,’ it ‘is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of
the citizens, and against any stealthy encroachments’” to fulfill the potential for detecting
crime. Id. (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 1886 (1886)).
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standard altogether while still pursuing an aggressive investigation exceeding
altogether the purpose of the stop.
2. The Use of Pretextual Automobile Stops
Relying on the probable cause warranting a stop for an identified traffic
violation is used, even by detectives who are part of an anti-drug task force, to
justify pursuing their drug investigations.60 Professor Cole reports that “[t]he
use of traffic stops as a pretext for investigating other crimes, particularly drug
offenses, is extremely common, and blacks and Hispanics are disproportion-
ately targeted by the practice.”61
“Because virtually anyone who drives a car is likely to violate one or more
of the myriad traffic regulations that govern the roads, this rule gives the police
license to use traffic stops to engage in encounters not otherwise justified by
objective, individualized suspicion.”62 These pretextual traffic stops—often
lacking probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion, that those “stopped” have
committed drug crimes—are often combined with aggressive officer requests
to search the contents of the automobile to ensure that drugs are not being
transported.63
The significance of Terry to this practice is illustrated by the course of
events recounted in Cole’s book on equal justice in our criminal justice system.
One drug task force officer found drugs in an automobile and justified the stop
based on the suspicion generated by a “drug courier profile.” When the district
attorney refused to prosecute because the use of the profile centered on race
and the use of out-of-state license plates—based on the legal conclusion that
“reasonable suspicion” could not be shown—the officer simply switched to
using traffic violations to justify detaining drivers and passengers whom he
deemed suspicious.64 Professor Cole noted that in alleged pretextual stop cases,
60 COLE, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 36.
61 Id. Along similar lines, Professor Alexander observes that several courts have “empha-
sized that granting police the freedom to stop, interrogate, and search anyone who consented
would likely lead to racial and ethnic discrimination.” ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW,
supra note 35, at 65.
62 Cole, Discretion and Discrimination, supra note 46, at 1076.  Professor Butler stated that
when he went on a “ride-along” with a DC officer, they played a game of selecting a car and,
within a few blocks, finding a reason to stop the car for some kind of violation. Butler, supra
note 13, at 252. Accord David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the
Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 273 (observing that “[s]ince
virtually everyone violates traffic laws at least occasionally, the upshot of these decisions is
that police officers, if they are patient, can eventually pull over almost anyone they choose”).
63 ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW, supra note 35, at 65 (observing that “consent searches
are valuable tools for the police only because hardly anyone dares to say no”). For more on
the inherently coercive use of consent searches as an ostensibly “voluntary” investigative
technique, see infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
64 See COLE, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 37–38. Professor Cole observed that a “subse-
quent lawsuit” was settled for $800,000 after a showing that of over 400 people stopped
based on this race-based profile, not one was “charged with a traffic offense or arrested for
drugs.” Id. at 38. Similarly, it has been estimated that in a DEA traffic stop/consent search
operation, no illegal drugs were found in 95 percent of the stops, while 98 percent of the
searches were based solely on the driver’s verbal “consent.” ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM
CROW, supra note 35, at 70.
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from 1993 to 1996, 80 percent of those stopped were minority drivers.65 This
sort of pretextual use of alleged traffic violations not only grants almost limit-
less power to law enforcement to target suspects to investigate, it virtually
invites racialized policing.
In spite of the inherently unreasonable use of pretextual traffic stops to
justify thorough drug investigations of those deemed suspicious, the Supreme
Court has held that there is no Fourth Amendment basis for challenging such
detentions or investigations.66 So police need not show reasonable suspicion of
a drug crime to justify making a traffic stop, and officers may stop anyone who
infringes even the most minor traffic code, though the traffic violation is being
exploited to stop the driver for some other reason.67 The probable cause to
believe that the law, in the form of traffic regulations, had been violated, justi-
fied the traffic stop even if its purpose was to investigate a racial minority
vaguely suspected of drug use or dealing. The officers freely admitted that they
had no interest in enforcing the traffic law; and the Court held that law enforce-
ment could constitutionally make a stop for a traffic violation even if the officer
had no legal authority under local regulations to make the stop and no intention
to enforce the law violated.68
The Supreme Court had in previous decisions seemingly recognized “that
pretextual activity sometimes violates the Fourth Amendment.”69 But Whren
characterized the defendant’s “pretext” argument as based on a contended-for
finding of the wrong “motivation,”70 even though it was rather clearly based on
the officer’s alleged “deviation from usual practice.”71 Hence, “[p]retext stops,
like consent searches, have received the Supreme Court’s unequivocal bless-
ing.”72 The net result of the Court’s utter rejection of any pretext doctrine is
that law enforcement officers are not only granted wide discretion with great
potential for abuse,73 but are virtually invited to engage in racialized policing.
As Professor Capers observed, when laws like traffic regulations grant great
discretion to law enforcement officers, they set up the use of “racial incon-
gruity” as sufficient for officers to justify stopping minority motorists.74 Little
wonder that one minority “was stopped . . . while traveling through a predomi-
nantly white neighborhood . . . for driving ‘too slowly.’”75
65 COLE, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 40. Even so, he reports defendants in many of
these cases argued that the stops were motivated by race, and these claims “invariably
failed.” Id.
66 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
67 Cole, Discretion and Discrimination, supra note 46, at 1076. Thus Professor Butler
pointed out that in Whren the “young black motorist” was “pulled over for, among other
things, waiting too long at a stop sign.” Butler, supra note 13, at 252.
68 COLE, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 39. A police regulation forbade plainclothes
officers to enforce traffic laws absent a threat to public safety. Id.
69 LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop,” supra note 51, at 1853.
70 Whren, 517 U.S. at 812.
71 LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop,” supra note 51, at 1854.
72 ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW, supra note 35, at 66.
73 And thus “police are allowed by the courts to conduct fishing expeditions for drugs on
streets and freeways based on nothing more than a hunch.” Id. at 88.
74 I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 70 (2009).
75 Id. at 71.
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Sadly as well, the impact of such practices becoming pervasive features of
American life within its major cities is the promotion of distrust and resentment
along racial lines. Professor Capers sums up what is ultimately at stake:
[W]hen the police patrol neighborhoods and use racial incongruity as a factor for
initiating an encounter or a stop and frisk, it sends the expressive message that neigh-
borhoods have a color. This in turn means that certain individuals belong, and others
are by default cast as aliens, intruders, suspect. The task then is to find a way of
policing that allows officers to do their job, reducing crime, and yet at the same time
does not have the unintended consequence of discouraging or inhibiting
integration.76
3. The Use of Train and Bus Sweeps
It has become a common drug investigation tactic to employ bus and train
sweeps to discover drug carriers and dealers.77 Such sweeps are not based on
probable cause to believe that drug carriers will be found, nor even on any
articulable, individualized (and hence reasonable) suspicion;78 they are rooted
in a mere awareness that drugs are often carried on buses and trains. Drug
investigators rely quite clearly on the Terry-based distinction between
“stops”—that constitute “seizures” under the Fourth Amendment—and mere
police-citizen “encounters” where the police conduct is not viewed as Fourth
Amendment activity at all.79 It is also a standard law enforcement tactic in such
cases to request of those deemed “suspicious”—because they are the right age,
sex, or race—that they allow law enforcement to search their luggage.80 These
so-called “consent searches” work much like determining that a police initiated
citizen encounter is not a “stop,” or any “detention” at all; so long as police do
not engage in coercive behavior—using force or directly asserting authority to
compel cooperation—search requests do not even implicate the Fourth Amend-
ment. Note, however, that in practice, though all persons theoretically have the
“right” to refuse to allow a search, “virtually everybody” in fact consents to
such searches.81
76 Id. at 72.
77 ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW, supra note 35, at 63; COLE, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra
note 4, at 16.
78 In Terry and subsequent cases, the Court has “held that a ‘seizure’ is unreasonable with-
out some articulable reason, specific to the individual, for suspecting crime.” COLE, EQUAL
JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 18. While formal arrests require probable cause, “all seizures
require at least some degree of individualized suspicion.” Id.
79 Professor Cole notes:
Not every encounter between a citizen and a police officer . . . is a ‘seizure’ that must be justified
under the Fourth Amendment.  Otherwise, police officers would not be able to approach anyone
on the street without first having grounds to suspect criminal conduct. . . . [T]he Court had ruled
that a police officer ‘seizes’ an individual when ‘by means of physical force or show of author-
ity, [the officer] has restrained [the citizen’s] liberty,’ and that the relevant question is whether a
reasonable person in the citizen’s shoes would feel ‘free to disregard the [officer’s] questions and
walk away.’
Id. (footnote omitted).
80 ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW, supra note 35, at 63 (bus sweeps invariably include
“interviews” that lead to “consent searches”).
81 COLE, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 16 (“One officer testified that he had searched
3,000 bags without once being refused consent.”).
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In a case challenging this police conduct,82 the Supreme Court reversed a
state court ruling excluding drug evidence based on the coercion inherently
present when officers stand above a bus passenger, question him and request to
search his luggage, and give him the dilemma of either cooperating with police
or removing himself from the bus in the middle of nowhere and separating
himself from his luggage.83 The Court acknowledged that Bostick “would have
risked being stranded and losing whatever baggage he had locked away in the
luggage compartment,” but reasoned that his being so “‘confined’ . . . was the
natural result of his decision to take the bus,” not a sign of police-imposed
coercion.84 The result “is that police are free to engage in dragnet-like searches
of buses and trains, in settings where it is extremely difficult for any citizen to
refuse to cooperate.”85
Of even greater concern than the discretion to act, this grant to law
enforcement is the inevitable impact of such constitutional policy on groups
most likely to be harmed by such discretionary decisions. Professor Cole
observes:
There are few available statistics on the racial breakdown of police stops. . . . A
search of all reported federal bus and train sweep cases from January 1, 1993, to
August 22, 1995, found that, of fifty-five cases in which the defendant’s race could
be identified, thirty-six were black, eleven were Hispanic, one was Asian, one was
Filipino, and six were white. As Justice . . . Marshall stated in dissent in Bostick, ‘the
basis of the distinction to single out particular passengers during a suspicionless
sweep is less likely to be inarticulable than unspeakable.’86
The selective enforcement that this application of constitutional policy
promotes creates a double standard they may “reflect a savvy political judg-
ment,” in that if “such suspicionless treatment” were applied to “everyone,
there would likely be sufficient political will to curtail the practice politically,
either by legislation or by community pressure on police departments.”87
III. EFFORTS TO DEFEND TERRY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE LAW
During the last twenty years or so a number of scholars, both criminal
procedure legal scholars and scholars on the practice of policing, have con-
tended that aggressive community policing appropriately involves the exercise
of broad discretion by law enforcement.88 Such scholars have argued “that con-
82 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
83 COLE, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 18–19. Cole emphasizes the totality of police
behavior—boarding the bus en route, “standing over” passengers, blocking the exits, dis-
playing their badges and guns, grilling passengers with questions—and concludes that treat-
ing the response as “voluntary” is “patently fictional,” allowing police to use the “rubric of
‘consent’ . . . to engage in a wide range of nonconsensual, coercive intrusions on privacy
without any basis for individualized suspicion.” Id. at 19–20.
84 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435–36.
85 COLE, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 19.
86 Id. at 21 (footnote omitted) (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 441 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing)).  Cole, Discretion and Discrimination, supra note 46, at 1076 (noting that in the refer-
enced search of sweep records, “nearly ninety percent of those stopped were minorities”).
87 COLE, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 21.
88 These developments in scholarly advocacy are nicely summarized in Professor Cole’s
“response” to these arguments in favor of wider police discretion. See Cole, Discretion and
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stitutional skepticism toward discretion in policing has outlived its utility.”89
Several of these scholars have placed little focus on Terry doctrine and the
cases developing it; rather, they have simply made the general point that
acceptance of a broad range of police discretion may facilitate more effective
law enforcement, and constitutional principle should not become a barrier to
effective efforts to fight crime.90 Based on the view that aggressive stop-and-
frisk actions by local police present effective tools for fighting crime, some
contend “that courts should defer to inner-city communities that choose to
empower police with broad discretion to respond to crime.”91 Quite recently,
for example, Professor Rosenthal argued that “there is a case to be made that
Terry deserves a significant share of the credit for the enormous decline in
violent crime that the nation has experienced in the past two decades or so.”92
An immediate problem with the thesis that recognizing the need for police
discretion presents us with a “coming crisis in criminal procedure,” is that judi-
cial doctrine aimed at restricting police has been significantly curtailed in
recent decades.93 Concerns for avoiding the granting of undue discretion to
police officers has clearly played a role in the development of important crimi-
nal procedure doctrine; but the chief characteristic of the last thirty years of
criminal procedure jurisprudence has been an increasingly deferential stance
toward the exercise of broad police discretion. Consider Professor Cole’s sum-
mary of the development of more deferential rules:
The Court has left the police free of Fourth Amendment constraints by finding
no reasonable expectation of privacy in many situations, by finding that many police-
citizen encounters are consensual, and by upholding consent searches without any
warning of the right to say no. These rules allow the police to approach and investi-
gate people for any reason or none at all; the officer’s discretion is wholly unregu-
lated. In other settings, the officer’s discretion is subject only to the most deferential
oversight, as in ‘stop and frisk’ encounters, which may be predicated on ‘reasonable
suspicion,’ a standard that itself defers substantially to the officer’s on-the-scene
judgment and experience. The ‘pretext stop’ doctrine permits the police to rely
pretextually on any traffic code infringement to stop persons for other reasons, and
the Court has expressly rejected the argument that persons in traffic stops should be
Discrimination, supra note 46, at 1063–70. Perhaps the most recent, and quite elaborate,
defense of discretionary community policing, that includes a careful defense of the decisions
in Terry and progeny, is found at Rosenthal, The Case Against Terry, supra note 3.
89 Cole, Discretion and Discrimination, supra note 46, at 1066 (citing Dan M. Kahan &
Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153,
1184 (1998)).
90 See, e.g., Kahan & Meares, supra note 89, at 1158–59.
91 Cole, Discretion and Discrimination, supra note 46, at 1066.
92 Rosenthal, The Case Against Terry, supra note 3, at 302.
93 Hence the “new discretion scholars” do not really contend for radical change, but are
offering justification for the status quo. Rather than law unduly limiting discretion, and
thereby creating a criminal law crisis, the problem “runs in precisely the opposite direction.”
Cole, Discretion and Discrimination, supra note 46, at 1073. The discretion we have granted
has led to great abuses, including “routine everyday indignities suffered by young black men
subjected to police encounters because of the color of their skin.” Id. at 1074. This creates a
“crisis in legitimacy,” where “members of the minority community are far more skeptical of
the criminal justice system than members of the white community, and for good reason.” Id.
Recognizing even more police discretion “would exacerbate this crisis.” Id.
Summer 2012] TERRY V. OHIO 623
told they have the right to leave before being asked to submit to a search of their
car.94
A question thus raised is whether one can defend Terry doctrine as it has
developed, acknowledging that it has come to extend virtually limitless discre-
tion to law enforcement, while still insisting that it validly construes the Fourth
Amendment.
Much of the defense of Terry and progeny is premised on the purely prag-
matic assessment that it helps in the fight against crime. Consider the defense
offered by Professor Rosenthal. On one hand, he acknowledges quite clearly
that the Fourth Amendment “does not permit police to do anything to secure
public order,” and that a consequence is that courts must find a “reasonable
accommodation” of liberty and the governmental interest in promoting secur-
ity.95 But he concluded that it simply is not true that Terry misapprehends the
“constitutional balance between liberty and order.”96 And, as we have seen, he
credits the use of stop-and-frisk tactics with sparking a decline in violent
crime.97 Though he almost stipulated that declaring portions of America to be
zones free of the Fourth Amendment would amount to permitting “police to do
anything to secure public order,” he all but acknowledges that Terry doctrine
has in practice come virtually to establish such a principle.
In earlier analysis, we noted that courts have come to show unusual defer-
ence to police judgments to stop and/or frisk based on the neighborhood the
“suspect” works or lives in.98 In an earlier article, Rosenthal acknowledged that
courts “grant police even greater leeway in ‘high crime areas,’” permitting
detentions and searches “on highly ambiguous conduct merely because that
conduct occurs in what the police can fairly characterize as a ‘high crime
neighborhood.’”99 He concluded: “Thus, the Court has effectively granted the
police greater authority to search and seize in many minority neighborhoods
than they have elsewhere.”100
Rosenthal also acknowledges that a report of the state attorney general in
New York, where the successes of “community policing” have been highly
touted, “expresses some skepticism about the New York Police Department’s
compliance with the Fourth Amendment.”101 The report estimated that 15 per-
cent of the forms filled out after stops did not articulate facts sufficient to jus-
tify the stop, while even more were inadequate in supplying information that
94 Id. at 1071–72 (footnotes omitted).
95 Rosenthal, The Case Against Terry, supra note 3, at 346. He contends that Terry was
“precisely” engaged in this process of accommodation. Id.
96 Id. The case does pose “a high risk of error when it comes to stop-and-frisk tactics,” and
“accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people,” he acknowledged, but he does not
find the “error rate” troubling in light of the virtue of permitting the investigation of potential
crime. Id at 346–47 (internal quotation marks omitted).
97 See id. at 302 and accompanying text.
98 See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
99 Lawrence Rosenthal, Gang Loitering and Race, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 99, 150
(2000) [hereinafter Rosenthal, Gang Loitering] (quoting Margaret Raymond, Down on the
Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the Character of the Neighborhood in Evaluating
Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 115–24 (1999)).
100 Id.
101 Rosenthal, The Case Against Terry, supra note 3, at 330 n.210.
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would enable one to determine whether reasonable suspicion was present.102 It
is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the difficulties aggressive community
policing has complying with the Fourth Amendment is related to the deference
shown to law enforcement discretion by courts in implementing the doctrine
announced in Terry.
Although Professor Rosenthal admits that the discretion granted to law
enforcement has contributed to the tendency by police to rely on racial profil-
ing—reflecting perhaps in part that the discretion it “grants police facilitates
discrimination by officers too willing to believe that persons of color are up to
no good”103—he still contends that, though police do “hit” racial minorities at
higher rates than whites, the differences may reflect that racial minorities
“offend at higher rates than non-minorities”—which leads them “to be subject
to Terry tactics at higher rates.”104
Even here, however, Rosenthal’s admissions about police conduct going
well beyond confronting violent crime generated by open-air drug markets in
the inner cities, supplies its own critique of Terry doctrine and its impact on
law enforcement practices. He acknowledges, for example, that there is “sub-
stantial potential for serious abuse” under “quite ordinary laws, such as traffic
regulations.”105 And, of course, the use of pretextual traffic stops is one of the
consistently abusive practices of contemporary law enforcement.106 Moreover,
he admits that it is not uncommon in the world outside the inner cities, for
middle and upper class persons of color to be “stopped because they appear
‘out of place”—a practice that should be rejected on a simple cost/benefit anal-
ysis.107 Nonetheless, even this analysis yields an anomalous conclusion: the
strongest opponents of such profiling, the “wealthier minorities” who can live
“where the costs of aggressive policing likely exceed their benefits,” are rea-
sonably opposed to “aggressive policing” simply because they do not face “the
Hobbesian world of drug dealers and gangs.”108
But if it is so clear that the pretextual traffic stops and the use of wide-
spread de facto segregation often violate a meaningful idea of Fourth Amend-
ment “reasonableness,” especially when practiced in America’s suburban
neighborhoods, one has to wonder whether aggressive stop-and-frisk tactics can
102 Id. Rosenthal also acknowledged that another study, for another city, found that 46 per-
cent of pat-down searches were unconstitutional. Id.
103 Id. at 347.
104 Id. at 348.  Moreover, the prosecution rates of minorities for drug offenses reflects in
part that open-air drug markets targeted by police “are disproportionately found in inner-city
minority communities.” Id. at 349. Since such drug markets “stimulate violent crime,” and
are subjected to aggressive stop-and-frisk tactics “aimed at reducing violent crime,” higher
minority search rates “provide little indication of official discrimination.” Id.
105 Rosenthal, Gang Loitering, supra note 99, at 151. In the same article, he also fully
admits that “the evidence of racial profiling is becoming increasingly potent.” Id.
106 See supra notes 60–76 and accompanying text.
107 Rosenthal, The Case Against Terry, supra note 3, at 356.
108 Id. Elsewhere, Rosenthal contended that public order laws are not “immune to abuse,”
but we need to consider “why aggressive policing is so frequently undertaken in inner-city
minority communities.” Rosenthal, Gang Loitering, supra note 99, at 156. “One fundamen-
tal reason that aggressive policing in the inner city is here to stay is that its residents want
criminality in their midst to be suppressed.” Id. The demand for greater law enforcement in
minority communities “cannot be overstressed.” Id.
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appropriately be based on the “neighborhoods” individuals live or work in.
Under Rosenthal’s justification, law enforcement appropriately relies on
“highly ambiguous conduct” of members of high crime communities to warrant
stop and frisk practice.109
IV. CONCLUSION
Professor Cole presents the real issues raised when we justify racial profil-
ing selectively by emphasizing the presumed effectiveness of aggressive polic-
ing in America’s inner cities. The danger is that we can easily wind up
implementing a “double standard” in evaluating the legality of police conduct:
[C]onstitutional doctrines that allow the police to use their discretion to enforce
double standards along race or class lines corrode the law’s legitimacy, particularly
among minorities and the poor. The loss of legitimacy in turn impedes law enforce-
ment in multiple ways. People alienated from the system are less likely to provide
leads to the police, to testify as witnesses for the prosecution, to serve on juries when
called, and to convict guilty defendants when they do serve. More fundamentally,
people who distrust the fairness of our legal system have less incentive to play by the
rules, and accordingly, double standards in law enforcement actually contribute to
criminal conduct in those neighborhoods that are already at most risk of criminal
behavior for socioeconomic reasons.110
As we confront the inevitable tension presented by the need for law
enforcement discretion and the importance of upholding the law’s legitimacy in
minority communities, it is crucial that we not underestimate the significance of
the latter. As Cole writes: “Legitimacy is all the more important in modern
policing, which relies substantially on developing and maintaining informal ties
with the community to do its work effectively.”111
109 See Rosenthal, Gang Loitering, supra note 99, at 150.
110 Cole, Discretion and Discrimination, supra note 46, at 1091 (footnote omitted). Profes-
sor Cole freely acknowledges that we must strike a balance between police discretion that is
essential and the limitations that are critical to maintaining the law’s legitimacy:
The critical importance of both legitimacy and discretion to effective policing creates a conun-
drum. On the one hand, to do community policing well the police must be vested with substantial
discretion. On the other hand, the very vesting of that discretion may undermine the law’s effec-
tiveness, to the extent that it fosters the appearance or reality of discrimination and robs the law
of its legitimacy. Accordingly, there is no silver bullet in this area. The police cannot of course
be denied all discretion. But neither can we give up on judicial control of discretion on the theory
that the political process will take up the slack, as the new discretion scholars advocate.
Id. at 1092.
111 Id.
